

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES

EFFORTS AND WAGES: A NEW LOOK  
AT THE INTER-INDUSTRY WAGE  
DIFFERENTIALS

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Working Paper 6626  
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w6626>

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH  
1050 Massachusetts Avenue  
Cambridge, MA 02138  
June 1998

Comments from our discussant Alan Deardorff and other participants at the NBER-Ford Conference in Monterey are gratefully acknowledged. Partly supported by a grant from the Sage foundation to Leamer. Any opinions expressed are those of the author and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

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Industry Wage Differentials  
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NBER Working Paper No. 6626  
June 1998  
JEL No. J31, J41

### **ABSTRACT**

We provide evidence that US workers face a wage-effort offer curve with the high-wage high-effort jobs occurring in the capital intensive sectors. We find that real wage offers rose at every level of effort during the 1960's, a shift which is consistent with a decline in the rental cost of capital. During the 1970's, when relative prices of labor-intensive goods declined, the wage-effort offer curve twisted, offering lower pay for the low-paid jobs in the labor-intensive sectors but higher pay for the high-paid jobs in the capital-intensive sectors. In the 1980's, workers at every wage level began to work more hours for the same weekly wage. This we loosely attribute either to the increasing cost of non-wage benefits, especially health care, or to the introduction of new equipment. In studying the wage-effort offer curve, we control for the business cycle, for the rate of unionization, education, and rent sharing.

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## 1.0 Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to provide empirical support for the theory of effort in a multi-sector model developed in Leamer(1996). That theory is built on the familiar idea that a firm can contract with workers regarding both the wage level and also the working conditions. Those features of the labor contract that enhance productivity but are disliked by workers are called “effort” and the labor market thus offers a set of wage-effort contracts with higher wages offsetting higher effort. If “effort” does not affect capital depreciation, the high effort-high wage jobs occur in the capital-intensive sectors where the capital cost savings from high effort are greatest.

Among the implications of this theory are: Communities inhabited by industrious workers who are willing to exert high effort for high wages have high returns to capital. A minimum wage does not cause unemployment. It forces effort in the low effort-low wage contracts up enough to support the higher wage. These and many other aspects of the model of endogenous effort are discussed in Leamer(1997b). In this paper we focus on the following two implications:

- The capital savings from effort are greatest in the capital-intensive sector which is where the high-wage high-effort contracts occur.
- Price declines in the labor-intensive goods twist the wage-effort offer curve, lowering the compensation for low-effort work but increasing the marginal return for hard work. Thus increased competition with the emerging third world adversely affects the low-effort workers who find themselves having to work harder to maintain their living standards. High-effort workers may be made better off by the increased marginal compensation for effort in high-wage high-effort jobs in the capital-intensive sectors.

We find empirical support for both of these hypotheses. We show that there is a surprisingly clear relationship between effort, wages and capital intensity, with higher capital intensity of the sector associated with both higher wages and higher effort. We look for and we find a twisting of the wage-effort offer curve in the 1970s, which we (somewhat casually) associate with increased globalization.

The obvious and possibly insurmountable problem that we face is how to measure effort, the product of hours of operation multiplied by the “intensity” of use. We have no measurement of job intensity, which is not merely of the speed of operations but also the attentiveness and willingness to take risks and any other intangibles

that raise productivity without increasing capital costs. Absent any obvious measure of job intensity, we take a first step in the direction of least resistance and use production workers' annual hours as our indicator of effort. We are thereby acting as if intensity is not so negatively correlated with hours that there is no relationship between hours and effort.

Given the measurement difficulties, we shouldn't be expecting much. The big surprise is that there is a remarkably clear relationship between hours, wages and capital intensity. The capital-intensive sectors have longer annual hours and higher hourly wage rates, exactly what the theory would suggest if hours were a perfect indicator of effort. Not only do we find a wage-effort offer curve; we also find it shifting just as the theory suggests. In the 1960s with stable relative prices but improving technologies, the curve shifts "upward" with higher real wages offered at every level of effort. Starting in the mid-1970s, when relative prices of apparel and footwear and textiles and other labor-intensive goods fell substantially, the offer curve "twists" with wages falling for low-effort contracts but rising for high-effort contracts. In the eighties the curve began shifting "to the right", with more hours required to attain any given level of earnings. The theory allows this last shift to be due either to the introduction of new machinery (computers) or to a rise in fixed costs other than capital, namely benefits.

The relationship between wages and capital intensity has been discussed in the efficiency wage literature, including papers by Dickens and Katz(1987a), Katz and Summers(1989), and Krueger and Summers(1987). We view the correlation between wages and capital intensity through an entirely different theoretical lens. Empirically, the innovation of this paper is the discovery of a strong correlation between weekly hours and capital intensity.

One surprising feature of the US wage-effort offer curve is that it bends backward in the early years of the sample, with the highest wages offered in sectors with relatively low effort (as measured by hours). The two-digit names of these unusual sectors are transportation, primary metals and printing and publishing. These names cry out to us "union effects." A union effect on wages can come from market power in the product market since it allows producers to pass on higher costs to consumers who have nowhere else to go. Beginning in the 1970s consumers did have somewhere else to go: auto imports from Japan and steel imports from a variety of countries. The erosion of union power seems evident in the wage-effort offer curve as the transportation and primary metal sectors increase their hours to conform more closely to the wage-hour contracts offered in other sectors. But our

measure of unionization is not able to account completely for this backward bending portion of the wage-effort offer curve. This may be due to the poor quality of the unionization data.

The most likely alternative explanation for the correlation between wages and capital intensity is complementarity of human and physical capital. We include measures of human capital as well as rate of unionization in our equations that explain wages and hours. Unionization and education both have positive simple correlations with weekly wages and weekly hours. Controlling for capital intensity of the sector, both education and union membership have a positive and statistically significant effect on wages but do not have a measurable effect on hours. Even after controlling for education and unionization, there remains strong evidence of the positive relationship between wages and effort that we are looking for.

Another possible explanation for the apparent wage-effort offer curve is rent-sharing with rents especially high in capital intensive sectors. We explore this possibility by using an imperfect measure of industry rents and do not find that rents can explain away our findings.

Our analysis could be contaminated by business cycle effects. The first response to a slowdown in sales is a reduction in hours and only when the slowdown is judged to be long-lived is there a reduction in employment. Then when sales begin to grow again the first response is to increase hours, followed later by an increase in employment. The variation in employment causes opposite variation in capital per worker because capital is a very slow-moving series. This cycle in hours and capital per worker causes us concern about our choice of dates for estimating the wage-effort offer curve since the movements in the curve over time may be mostly due to the cycle. We control for the cycle by estimating the wage-effort offer curve at business cycle peaks and business cycle trough, and then comparing peak with peak and trough with trough.

The theory that drives the data analysis concerns the demand for labor, but the market of course has to have a supply side as well. We do briefly explore one labor-supply variable: gender. We find what is already rather well known: females are more likely to be employed in low effort-low hours sectors.

In the next section of this paper we review pertinent aspects of the theory offered in Leamer(1997b). Also in Section 2 we summarize related literature. We argue that we offer a unique theoretical viewpoint that is distinct from efficiency wage literature and that leads us to estimating an entirely new equation that explains hours as a function of the capital intensity of the sector. In Section 3 we discuss graphical displays of the 2-digit SIC data on

hours and wages. These displays conform remarkably well with the theory. The capital-intensive sectors have long hours and high hourly wage rates. We also present a formal analysis at the 4-digit level that backs up what is evident in the 2-digit displays. Finally, we offer some summary and concluding remarks in Section 4.

## 2.0 Theoretical 2-Sector Model

This section reviews Leamer's(1997b) two-sector model with endogenous effort. The key building block is a production function defined as

$$(2.1) \quad Q = s \cdot h \cdot f(K, L) \equiv e \cdot f(K, L)$$

where  $Q$  is the rate of output per unit of time,  $K$  and  $L$  are the (timeless) stocks of capital and labor inputs respectively,  $f(.,.)$  is a function homogeneous to degree one,  $s$  is the "intensity" of operation,  $h$  is the hours of operation, and  $e = s \cdot h$  is the overall effort exerted by each worker. Intensity is influenced by speed of operations but includes also the level of care or attentiveness a worker must exert to reduce the likelihood of breakdowns and other costly delays in the production process.

We make two additional assumptions about effort. First we assume that labor cares about effort, but capital does not. In other words, long hours at high speed will not wear out equipment any faster than short hours at slow speed. The second assumption is that effort is continuous and completely variable, which is an assumption that affects the details but not the basic message of the model.<sup>2</sup> For generating most of the diagrams we assume that each sector has fixed input technologies and the production function takes the form

$$(2.2) \quad Q_i = e_i \cdot \min\left(\frac{L}{A_{Li}}, \frac{K}{A_{Ki}}\right)$$

where  $e_i$  is the effort level in sector  $i$  and  $K$  and  $L$  are the capital and labor inputs. With the assumption that depreciation doesn't depend on worker effort, a competitive labor market will award any marginal increase in output from greater effort to the workers. Expressed differently, it is as if the workers rented the capital equipment

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<sup>2</sup> There is a substantial literature built on the assumption that capital does care- that increased utilization caused increased depreciation. A recent working paper by Auernheimer and Rumbos(1996) includes many references, among them Calvo(1975) and Bischoff and Kokkelenberg(1987). This literature typically uses a one sector model and focuses on inter-temporal capital usage questions. This paper instead emphasizes sectoral differences. Deardorff and Stafford(1976) provide another framework that allows both capital and labor to care about the pace and hours of operation. They write output proportional to hours of operation and explore the coordination problem between two inputs that have different preferences regarding hours of work.

and received the excess earnings as compensation for the effort they decide to exert. The (net) wage rate  $w_i(e_i)$  applicable to effort  $e$  can be found from the zero profit condition  $p_i \cdot e_i \cdot f(K, L) = w_i(e_i) \cdot L + r \cdot K$ , where  $r$  is the rental rate of capital and  $p_i$  is the price of the product.<sup>3</sup> Inserting the labor and capital inputs and output levels into the zero profit condition and dividing by total output determines the set of zero-profit wage effort contracts in sector  $i$

$$(2.3) \quad \frac{w_i}{P} = \frac{p_i \cdot e_i}{P \cdot A_{Li}} - \frac{r \cdot A_{Ki}}{P \cdot A_{Li}}$$

where  $P$  is an overall price index. The wage-effort zero-profit lines for two different sectors are illustrated in Figure 2.1.


Both zero profit lines in Figure 2.1 have negative intercepts since at very low levels of effort the value of the output is not large enough to cover capital rental costs. Since the capital costs in the capital-intensive sector are higher, the intercept is more negative. As the effort increases, workers can be awarded higher wages in both sectors.<sup>4</sup> The observed labor contracts will lie along the upper envelope of these wage-offer curves, highlighted as the heavy curve depicted in Figure 2.1. The marginal return to effort has to be lower in the labor-intensive sector since otherwise there would be no attractive contracts in the capital-intensive sector. These intercepts and slopes dictate that the low effort-low wage contracts are offered in the labor-intensive sector while high wage-high effort contracts are offered in the capital-intensive sector. Also depicted in Figure 2.1 is an indifference curve tangent to the wage-effort offer curve at two points. This represents an equilibrium with identical workers who are indifferent between the two prevailing contracts: high effort-high wage and low effort-low wage.

High effort saves capital costs. These savings are offset by the wage premiums necessary to compensate workers for high levels of effort. Multiple shifts and other forms of capital sharing can also save capital costs. When two workers share the same capital the intercept of the zero-profit line for each worker shifts upward towards the origin by the factor of two. This allows firms to offer better wage-effort contracts. But capital sharing

<sup>3</sup> Note that the rental rate of capital could also be considered to include depreciation expenses.

<sup>4</sup> Average capital cost is  $AC_K = r \cdot K / q \cdot e$  where  $q$  is the level of output when  $e = 1$ . The capital cost savings of effort is  $\partial AC_K / \partial e = -r \cdot K / q \cdot e^2$ , clearly larger at any one specific level of effort  $e$  for industries with a greater

**Figure 2.1: Equilibrium in a Two-Sector Model with Fixed Input Technologies**



doesn't come without costs. Among the costs of capital sharing are wage premia for second and graveyard shifts, transitional down-times and increased non-capital fixed costs such as training and benefits, as well as moral hazard problems and coordination costs. Competition among firms will lead to efficient work practices that optimally trade off the gains from capital sharing with the costs.

### 2.1 Endogenous Effort with Cobb-Douglas Technologies

If the capital/labor ratio in a sector is not fixed technologically, the wage-effort offer curve loses its flat segments, but otherwise there is no material change in the model. For example a Cobb-Douglas production function is

$$(2.4) \quad q = e \cdot k^\beta$$

where  $q$  is output per worker,  $k$  is the capital used by each worker and  $\beta$  is the capital intensity. The optimal level of capital is determined by setting the marginal revenue product of capital equal to the capital rental rate  $r$ .


$$(2.5) \quad \beta \cdot p \cdot e \cdot k^{\beta-1} = r \Rightarrow k = \left( \frac{r}{p \cdot e \cdot \beta} \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta-1}}$$

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overall capital cost per worker. These cost savings are offset by the marginal increase in wages necessary to compensate the worker for their additional efforts.



**Figure 2.2: Wage-Effort Offer Curve with Cobb-Douglas Production Function**



Since capital's marginal rate of productivity changes with the level of effort, the optimal level of capital inputs and varies with the level of effort. Substituting (2.4) for  $q$  and (2.5) for  $k$  in the zero profit condition,  $w = p \cdot q - r \cdot k$ , we find that the sector wage-effort offer curve becomes


$$(2.6) \quad w = p^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}} \cdot e^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}} \cdot r^{\frac{-\beta}{1-\beta}} \cdot \left( \beta^{\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}} - \beta^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}} \right).$$

This sets wage offers proportional to effort raised to a power that exceeds one and that increases with the capital-intensity of the sector. A two-sector equilibrium with Cobb-Douglas production functions is displayed in Figure 2.2. It is very similar to the equilibrium seen in Figure 2.1. In fact it is easy to demonstrate that if the line tangent to the offer curves was traced back to the y-axis the intercept would be the negative cost of capital,  $r \cdot k$ .

## 2.2: Changes in Product Prices

A change in the relative price in the two sectors twists the wage-effort offer curve. Figure 2.3 depicts the initial effect of a simultaneous rise in  $p_2$  and fall in  $p_1$  that leaves the overall price level  $P$  constant. What this does is rotate upward the wage-effort offer line in the capital-intensive sector and rotate downward the wage-effort offer line in the labor-intensive sector. These changes render the low effort-low wage contract in the labor-intensive sector less attractive and causes income and substitution effects in opposite directions for the two contracts. The high-wage workers experience a favorable income effect and a substitution effect in favor of higher


Figure 2.3: Initial Effect of a Rise in the Relative Price of the Capital Intensive Tradable



effort (steeper wage-effort offer line). The low-wage workers experience an unfavorable income effect and a substitution effect in favor of lower effort.

With identical workers, this cannot be an equilibrium because capital constraints do not allow all workers to operate in the preferred capital-intensive sector. An increase in the capital-rental rate would be needed to ration the consequent excess demand for capital. This rise in the rental rate of capital shifts both wage-effort offer lines downward. Both the initial rotation and the shift downward worsen the terms of the low-wage low-effort contract and it follows that the final equilibrium selects a lower worker indifference curve for the representative worker. The negative income effect that shifts the contracts to a lower indifference curve will also cause lower wages and higher effort in both sectors provided that both leisure and the consumption goods are “normal”. There is also a substitution effect that tends to drive the contracts in opposite directions; the low effort-low wage contract shifts in favor of lower effort and lower wages, and the high effort-high wage contracts shift in favor of higher wages and higher effort. Thus a rise in the relative price of the capital-intensive good makes workers worse off and increases income inequality. Keep in mind that the workers are indifferent between the two contracts and there is no ‘real’ inequality in the model. The principle message is that the wage-effort offer curve twists, as shown in Figure 2.4. We do find this kind of twisting in the 1970s.

**Figure 2.4: Twisting of the Market Wage-Effort Offer Curve**  
Market Response to Relative Price Change



### 2.3: Heterogeneous Workers

The model presented above can easily be amended to allow for variation in workers' attitude towards effort. This change has little impact on our empirical work since we are studying the demand side of the labor market wage-effort offer curve, not the choices that workers make from among the offered contracts. In a model with heterogeneous preferences, materialistic workers who have a relative preference for goods over leisure would take the high-effort high-wage jobs while humanistic workers who prefer leisure would take the low-effort low-wage work. Heterogeneity in labor supply doesn't affect much how we study the demand side of the market, but this form of heterogeneity is important from a policy standpoint. The twisting of the offer curve caused by declines in the relative price of labor-intensive goods may have an adverse affect on the utility level of the humanists but a favorable effect on the materialists. In other words the welfare effects of changes in economic fundamentals such as relative prices may vary across groups of workers.


However, heterogeneity in *ability* is a serious problem for our empirical analysis. If the ability to operate expensive machinery varies across individuals, it is possible to have the more able receiving high wages for low effort in the capital-intensive sectors while the less-able work hard for low pay in the labor-intensive sectors. This would seriously affect our attempts to uncover the offer curve from observed contracts. We do partially allow for this by including in the empirical analysis measures of education.

## 2.4 Technological Change

This subsection discusses the effect of technological change on the wage-effort offer curve. The debate regarding the increase in inequality in the United States has focused on two culprits: globalization and technological change. We have shown that globalization taking the form of price declines for labor-intensive goods twists the wage-effort offer curve. It is an unfortunate but familiar outcome that technological change can have almost the same effect. We would have liked in this paper to have made a substantial effort to try to disentangle technological effects from globalization effects but that task requires direct indicators of both technological change and globalization. When we occasionally slip into interpreting a certain twist of the wage-effort offer curve as a globalization effect or a technological effect, we do so loosely and based on information not contained in this paper.

Figure 2.5 depicts an initial wage-effort offer curve and the first changes that are induced by three different kinds of technical change in the capital-intensive sector: a reduction in the rental cost of existing equipment, introduction of new more-costly equipment, and learning by doing. A reduction in the rental cost of the existing equipment simply shifts the intercept upward of the wage-effort line applicable to the capital-intensive sector, as indicated by the positioning of the new wage-effort offer (the dashed gray line). New more costly equipment creates a new wage-effort line that has a lower intercept but a steeper slope - meaning that the rental cost of the equipment is greater but the productivity is higher. Learning by doing

**Figure 2.5: Effect of Technological Change on Wage-Effort Offer Curve**



Learning by doing doesn't affect the rental cost but it increases the productivity. Thus the intercept stays the same but the slope increases. These first effects of new technology create better jobs in the capital-intensive sector and the economy in each case would have to experience an increase in the capital rental rates (interest rate) to ration the capital and encourage workers to stick with jobs in the labor-intensive sector. This is the usual general equilibrium story. Capital is helped/hurt depending on whether the technological change is in the capital-/labor- intensive sector. Unlike the usual case, labor here has a mixed experience. Before the rental rate of capital is bid up, each of the figures shows an improvement in the high-wage high-effort contracts. When the rental rate of capital is bid up to equilibrate the capital market, the wage-effort offer curve shifts downward across the board. This means that the low-effort low-wage contracts are definitely hurt by whatever kind of technological change may occur in the capital-intensive sector, but it is possible, depending on labor supply elasticities, to have net improvement in the highest-wage highest-effort jobs remaining in the final equilibrium.


Unfortunately, the twisting of the wage-effort offer curve associated with technological change is essentially the same as the twisting associated with globalization. Thus we aren't going to get very far trying to sort trade from technology by only studying the offer curve.

## **2.5 Previous Literature**

There is a substantial previous literature on hours and wages. Unlike this paper which explores the demand side, much of the discussion of hours in labor economics is concerned with the supply side: the worker's choice of hours. The budget constraint often assumed to face workers has earnings proportional to hours worked. An exception is Oi(1962) which assumes that firms experience a fixed training cost for each employee hired. The fixed costs that we emphasize are not training costs but capital rental charges. Another fixed cost that has recently increased in importance is worker benefits paid on a per-worker basis instead of a per-hour basis. Of course, nothing theoretically hinges on what are the fixed costs - the message of the model is that both hours and hourly wage rates should be greater the greater are the fixed costs.

Barzel(1973) added another curved portion to the budget constraint based on the assumption that labor productivity falls as the number of working hours increased within a fixed period of time, leading to the reversed 'S' shaped budget constraint cited in such empirical work as Moffit(1984). Barzel's and Oi's budget curves are displayed in Figure 2.6.

Figure 2.6: Labor Demand Functions in Previous Literature



There has been a substantial amount of empirical work in this field, although again most of this work has been more concerned with labor supply than labor demand. Sherwin Rosen (1973) was one of the first to investigate the inter-industry relationship between wages and hours. His reasoning of the apparent wage-hour tradeoff was neatly summarized in his introduction.

*"Hours of work are an important non-pecuniary aspect of employment, even though 'industry' per se is not. On the other hand, wage and hour differences can persist because firms find certain attributes of their employees more productive and desirable than others and are willing to incur extra costs to obtain them."*

He divides his analysis into supply and demand sides. On the demand side he, like Oi, correlated hours with the fixed costs of employing labor, including hiring costs, specific training and unemployment insurance premiums above the minimum levels. The demand for hours per employee is a decreasing function of the wage rate and an increasing function of these fixed costs. While he has no direct measure of these fixed costs across the industries in his sample he derives what he believes to be suitable industry proxies from a number of demographic variables including age, education and race. No mention of capital intensity is included in his work. He also considers short run adjustments by including a variable to measure the sectoral growth rate and also other external effects including unions. In general he has more success measuring the demand side of the equation than the supply side.

On the labor supply side are papers by Moffit (1984), Lundberg (1985) and Biddle and Zarkin (1989). These are primarily concerned with identifying the factors that influence the hours worked by individual workers, and the relationship between hours and wages as measured from the worker's perspective. They all point out that traditional OLS wage regressions which include hours worked as a right hand side variable will not adequately measure the wage-hour relationship because of the endogeneity of hours. Biddle and Zarkin specifically control for

this endogeneity and find the bias to be significant. After controlling for this bias they find that male wages increase as a function of hours first in an increasing then at a decreasing rate. Less in line with our work are papers on the intertemporal behavior of hours and earnings such as Bernanke(1986) and Abowd and Card(1987,1989). These papers are concerned again with the supply side. Abowd and Card consider how individuals alter their hours of work over time. Bernanke is interested in how earnings and hours varied in eight industries during the great depression.

The efficiency wage literature has some elements of similarity with our approach, but the differences are substantial and important. Our key variable is the capital-intensity of the task - the greater the capital-intensity the greater is the effort exerted by the worker. Most of the efficiency wage theory initiated by Shapiro and Stiglitz(1984), collected in Akerlof and Yellen(1986) and surveyed in Katz(1986) makes no reference at all to the capital intensity of the operation. These efficiency wage models are all based on the idea that firms can increase profits by raising wages above the market clearing price. These above-market wages reduce monitoring costs since workers are induced to provide high effort by the threat of termination and thus a wage reduction.

The efficiency wage conceptual framework is very different from ours. After controlling for ability, we have workers preferring their own job or indifferent between their wage-effort contract and those contracts available to them in other jobs. The efficiency wage theory, on the other hand, suggests that high wages reflect worker rents needed to coerce workers in the good jobs not to shirk. According to the efficiency wage theory, workers in low-wage jobs prefer and are able to do the high-wage work, but are prevented from bidding for the better jobs in order to make the threat of firing have force in the high-wage contracts. Another important difference is that we have high-effort jobs in capital-intensive sectors and low-effort jobs in labor-intensive sectors. In the efficiency wage literature, worker effort need not vary across sectors. There can be a high-effort low-wage perfectly monitored job and a high-effort high-wage imperfectly monitored job.

Empirically the efficiency wage literature includes one of our two fundamental equations but not the other. We explain wages and hours both as a function of capital intensity. The first equation is part of the efficiency wage tradition, the second is not. Indeed, the efficiency wage literature was partly instigated by observation of the substantial differences in wages across industries. The correlation of the industry premiums with capital intensity was noted at least as far back as Slichter(1950). This has been empirically investigated in recent years in papers by

Dickens and Katz(1987a), Katz and Summers(1989), and Krueger and Summers(1987). The inter-industry wage pattern has been shown to be steady over time and remarkably consistent across different countries. The wage premiums in the capital intensive sectors have been attributed to variety of potential reasons including higher costs of monitoring, more inelastic labor demand and higher cost of worker shirking (close in spirit to our own work). It has been noted that disentangling these various effects can be difficult because of the simultaneity problem; since wages and capital-intensity are considered to be jointly determined.

The new empirical finding in this paper is not the well-known correlation between wages and capital intensity but rather the correlation between weekly hours and capital intensity. This correlation may either be explained by, contradict, or complement the efficiency wage findings, depending on other assumptions. First the contradiction. The efficiency wage literature generally assumes that weekly hours are fixed and intensity of effort is variable and costly to observe. But if hours of work are variable and if workers prefer fewer hours, then an “efficiency contract” can stipulate both a higher hourly wage rate and also fewer weekly hours than the prevailing market contract. This would make us expect a negative correlation between hours and wage rates.

If instead employers are indifferent to the number of hours worked by each individual employee per week (monitoring problems but no fixed costs) then the relationship between hours and capital intensity could merely be a secondary labor supply effect caused by the high hourly wages offered in capital-intensive sectors. Workers rationally choose to work more weekly hours because of the higher opportunity cost of leisure. This view of course makes the additional assumption that substitution effects outweigh income effects.

Our findings could also complement the efficiency wage literature. Some monitoring costs are like capital costs in that they are paid per worker rather than per hour. Other may be subject to learning curves and other economies of scale. Then our theory suggests that industries that incur high monitoring costs would also require their workers to exert additional effort. Thus the inter-industry wage differential would be part wage premium, part compensation for higher effort.

Distinguishing between these possibilities is not necessary for our purposes and clearly outside the scope of this paper. Our whole approach of tracing out the wage-effort offer curve at different points in time and connecting its movements to changes in product prices, technology and worker benefits represents a substantial departure from the efficiency wage literature. This comes from the very different conceptual frameworks that



underlie wages determined to solve monitoring problems from wages that are instead payment for observable effort.

### 3.0 Empirical Evidence from the Census of Manufactures

The theory of effort can explain a large number of empirical facts including wage differences across industries, productivity differences across countries, and the limited capital flow from high wage to low wage regions. The purpose of this paper is to breathe more life into this theory by showing that the US labor market does seem to have a wage-effort offer curve. Two data sets are employed to this purpose, industry level data from the Bartelsman-Becker-Gray Manufacturing Productivity Data (hereafter NBER)<sup>5</sup> and data at the worker level from the March *Current Population Surveys* (hereafter CPS).<sup>6</sup> We will assume initially that all workers are identically productive and that there is a single wage-effort curve with higher wages compensating for higher effort levels. This wage-effort offer curve is indexed by the capital intensity of the sector, with the high-effort, high-wage contracts occurring in the capital-intensive sectors. Workers may have the same tastes and therefore be indifferent among the wage-effort contracts that are formed, or workers may have different attitudes towards effort with the industrious (or materialistic) choosing high effort-high wage contracts and with the slothful (humanistic) workers choosing low effort-low wage jobs. Later we will allow ability differences proxied by education levels.

Measurement of intensity of effort is the biggest problem we face. Effort is the product of unobservable “intensity” times observable hours. Fortunately, since effort is our dependent variable, measurement errors cause noise but not bias. Although we suspect that hours and intensity of work are positively correlated, it is enough that they are not so negatively correlated as to destroy any positive association between effort and hours.

Capital sharing from shift or temp work might cause us serious difficulties, but it doesn't. If the same capital  $K$  is used by two different workers over the course of a day, then our measure of the capital intensity of the

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<sup>5</sup> The NBER Manufacturing Productivity database, constructed by Eric Bartelsman and Wayne Gray, contains annual information on 450 manufacturing industries from 1958 to 1991. The industries are those defined in the 1972 Standard Industrial Classification, and cover the entire manufacturing sector. The data themselves come from various government data sources, with many of the variables taken directly from the Census Bureau's Annual Survey of Manufactures and Census of Manufactures. The advantages of using the NBER database are that it gathers together many years of data, adjust for changes in industry definitions over time, and links in a few additional key variables (i.e. price deflators and capital stock). For more information go to the NBER website.

<sup>6</sup> The sample represented in the Current Population Survey March Demographic data was further reduced to those workers who worked between 20 and 80 hours in the previous week, who made at least \$2.50 per hour in \$1987, were between the ages of 17 and 75, and were not self employed.


job correctly is equal to  $K/2$ , since 2 is the number of employees. Likewise, if one worker uses the equipment  $K$  for half the year, and another uses it for the other half, then the annual rental cost is also proportional to  $K/2$ , which we appropriately measure because the number of employees is doubled. Thus both shift-work and temp-work are compatible with our theory and with our empirical work. What we don't allow for are set-up times associated with the handing of the capital from one worker to the next. Nor do we allow for unused capacity that is not "charged" against labor. But we think both of these are relative minor concerns.

### **3.1: Evidence of the Wage-Effort Tradeoff from 2-Digit Manufacturing Data**

Given the potential problems with the use of hours as a measure of effort it is perhaps remarkable that we are able to find a clear relationship across manufacturing industries between the average number of hours worked per week and hourly wages. Figure 3.1 depicts two-digit SIC data on industry average weekly hours and industry average weekly wages for production workers at six different periods of time between 1950 and 1995. All six scatter diagrams have a remarkably clear association between hours and wages, exactly what we are looking for, with printing and publishing being the one outlier, offering a low-hour and high wage contract. Of course it isn't surprising that people who work more hours earn more, but Figure 3.1 has the increase in wages more than proportional to the average weekly hours, which we take as a reward for saving capital costs. These first data displays leave us excited about the accuracy of the theory. Low wage-low effort contracts are being offered in the labor-intensive industries such as apparel and leather, while high wage-high effort contracts are being offered in the capital-intensive sectors such as transport and chemicals.

Another interesting feature of the data displayed in Figure 3.1 is the backward bend in the early periods which is ironed out by 1980. The bend is associated with transportation and primary metals which offer high wages but lower hours than some of the other sectors. Printing and publishing is on the backward bending part of the curve in 1950 but separates entirely from the rest of the curve thereafter. We are inclined to think that the backward bending part of the curve is due to unionization effects. Production workers in transport and primary metals have unionization rates of over 55% compared to a 30% overall unionization rate for production workers in

**Figure 3.1: Real Weekly Wages and Weekly Hours, 1950 to 1995**  
 Wages on Vertical Axis. By 2 digit SIC manufacturing industries, Source: Citibase database



manufacturing industries.<sup>7</sup> But printing has an unionization rate of only 14%.<sup>8</sup> It may be that printing of newspapers requires intense worker effort during relatively few hours in a day..

Textiles is another unusual sector. Textiles in 1970 and earlier had many more hours but about the same wages as apparel and leather. Relatively high wage growth in textiles has moved the textile point closer to the rest of the scatter. This change has been accompanied by an increase in the average number of hours worked per week by production workers in this sector. The only other standout sector is furniture and fixtures which has been moving the opposite direction, from offering high wage-high effort contracts on par with chemicals in the 50's to wage-effort contracts more on par with instruments and electrical products in 1995.

### 3.2 Trends and Cycles in Hours and Employment

We are concerned that some of these shifts in the wage-effort offer curve may be associated with the business cycle. The unit of time to which the wage-effort offer curve applies is the implicit contract period which may be a worker lifetime and which almost certainly covers the business cycle. If a business cycle defines the time unit, then the capital/labor ratio should be the capital stock divided by peak employment. In addition, both earnings and hours should refer to the whole cycle not to a subset of time within a cycle. When we use annual data, the measured capital intensity is inappropriately high at the trough of the cycle when employment is low. When we use annual data we overestimate the effort level and the wages since we do not account for the idleness of workers at the trough. For these reasons, we worry that when we trace out the apparent wage-effort offer curve over time we may think that we see shifting offers when all that is happening is a business cycle.

Figure 3.2 shows how closely the employment rate and average weekly hours move together over time, with hours worked leading the cycle in employment.<sup>9</sup> Average hours peaked at over 41 hours in the late sixties when unemployment was down to less than 4%. Average hours bottomed out at slightly over 39 hours in the late fifties and again in the early eighties when unemployment rates were measured at 7% and 10% respectively.<sup>10</sup>

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
<sup>7</sup> These numbers were calculated from the Current Population surveys and refer to unionization rates in the 1990's. There is every reason to believe that the patterns of unionization have been roughly constant over time, if not the overall numbers.

<sup>8</sup> The most unionized sector inside the printing sector is 'newspaper publishing' with an unionization rate of 30%. It is unlikely that disaggregation is going to resolve this puzzle.

<sup>9</sup> Data collect from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The employment rate is measured as 1 - unemployment rate. Weekly hours are measured for production workers.

<sup>10</sup> It is worth noting the distinct difference between average weekly hours as collected in the NBER productivity database and the data presented here, with the BLS calculating average weekly hours at about 1 hour more than the

**Figure 3.2: Average Employment Rates and Hours- Production Workers**  
 Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics




We note the run-up in average hours in the late eighties and early nineties to peak levels and the corresponding increase in the rate of employment to high levels but not to the historically high levels seen in the mid-sixties. This seems to imply that there has been some distinct break between these two series occurring in the early eighties. We find this increase to be endemic across all industries in the NBER data. We are inclined to attribute this to a reaction to an increase in benefits which are paid on a per-worker basis not a per-hour basis. Firms thus save on costs of benefits by increasing hours. But the introduction of new highly expensive and very expensive equipment can have a similar effect.

Cycles and trends are eliminated by subtracting the overall average from the sectoral hours data displayed in Figures 3.3a and 3.3b. The high hours sectors in 1993 are displayed in panel a and the low hours sectors in panel b. For example a worker in apparel (in Figure 3.3b) worked about 4 hours less compared to the average production worker. This value has remained steady over the 45 years mapped out here. On the top is the paper industry where a worker works about 2.5 more hours per week than the average production worker.


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NBER data. The BLS data is collected from the Current Population Surveys while the NBER data was collected from the Census of Manufacturers. The primary difference between these two data sets is their ultimate source, firms for the Census of Manufacturers and individual respondents for the Current Population surveys. In the CPS the data on hours employed per week includes those employed at all jobs. Thus the average is dragged up by the set of individuals who take employment at more than one firm as well as recollection error.

**Figure 3.3a: Smoothed Variation in 2-Digit Industry Hours from Manufacturing Mean**  
 Source: Citibase Database



**Figure 3.3b: Smoothed Variation in 2-Digit Industry Hours from Manufacturing Mean**  
 Source: Citibase Database




Notable exceptions to the stability of these results are highlighted in black. They include especially transport and primary metals, each which experienced an increase in average hours of about 3 hours per week. These two industries were the same two that formed the backward bending portion of the wage-effort offer curve in

the seventies. The increase in the number of hours in these two industries is clearly tied to the same reasons the backward bending portion of the wage-effort curve disappeared from the data, i.e. most likely the decline of unionization. Those changing in the opposite direction, albeit on a smaller scale, include furniture and food which both experienced a 2 hour decline. The food sector and the furniture sector experienced a small decline in their relative capital intensity compared to other manufacturing industries, perhaps explaining the decline in the average number of weekly hours worked in this industry.

### 3.3 Displays of the 1990 4-digit industry data

The 4-digit industry data in the NBER productivity database are considerably more noisy than the 2-digit data, but the same pattern emerges. Capital-intensive sectors pay high wages and have long hours. Figure 3.4 shows the distinctly positive relationship between average weekly hours and average real weekly wages for production workers across the industries included in the NBER data in 1990.<sup>11</sup> Also striking is the strong positive relationship between the capital intensity of the sector with both average hours worked per week by

**Figure 3.4: Capital Intensity, Wages and Hours across 4 digit Manufacturing Industries, 1990**  
Source: NBER Productivity Database



<sup>11</sup> The data have been smoothed using a three period weighted average over the time series provided in the NBER data, where the weight is the percent variation from the three year median. The reason we use this particular method is because the 'hours' data in the NBER data is subject to what would appear to be unreasonable fluctuations in hours per production work and hourly wages. Often hourly wages will increase by 50% or more while hours worked per worker drop by 50%. This almost certainly is due to basic errors in the recording of the data. Using the deviation from the median as a weight eliminates the effect of large outliers in the data. It represents between 12 and 14 million production workers separated into 448 different manufacturing industries. Only production workers are discussed here because unfortunately data on average hours per week for non-production workers are not provided in the NBER data.

production workers as well as weekly wages. Of these two, the relationship between capital and hours is noisier.

This is likely due to short-term fluctuations in industry demand that are absorbed more by hours than by wages as well as due to the existence of greater noise in reported hours than in reported weekly earnings.

We expect a positive relationship to exist between weekly hours and weekly wages in the short run due to the inelasticity of the industry specific labor supply and normal fluctuations in relative industry demand. This could explain the upward sloping relationship seen in any one year. Yet as seen in the 2-digit data, the pattern of wages and hours across sectors is very stable over time. For example the correlation of weekly wages across sectors between 1990 and 1960 is

.82 as can be seen in Table 3.1 which reports the cross-industry correlations of hours and wages at the various sample years, remarkably stable even over a thirty-year time period. Hours across sectors are also very stable. The correlation of weekly hours across sectors in 1960 and 1990 is .56.

Some of the association between hourly wages and weekly hours may come from the institutionalized 40-hour workweek and the legal requirement for overtime pay rates for weekly hours beyond 40. But legally mandated overtime need not have any affect even when overtime is observed. If a firm is willing to pay \$430 for 42 hours of work, the contract can stipulate 42 hours at \$430/42 per hour, or, to comply with the law, the contract can stipulate an hourly rate of \$10 with time and a half for over time. This wouldn't have any effect at all on the observed wage-effort offer curve. What the mandated overtime law really does is limit the flexibility of contracts over time and it affects firms that experience variability in the demand for labor. Our focus on the longer-run aspects of the contract that are evident in the cross-section comparison of different industries means that mandated overtime is not a substantial concern. The fact that some industries appear consistently to require their workers to work more than 40-hour workweeks despite mandated overtime pay premiums is support for this idea.

**Table 3.1: Correlation of weekly hours and wages by 4-Digit Industry across sample years**

*Wages*

Year	60	65	70	75	80	85	90	94
60	1.00							
65	0.97	1.00						
70	0.95	0.98	1.00					
75	0.90	0.93	0.95	1.00				
80	0.86	0.89	0.91	0.97	1.00			
85	0.84	0.86	0.89	0.94	0.97	1.00		
90	0.83	0.86	0.88	0.93	0.95	0.97	1.00	
94	0.82	0.85	0.87	0.91	0.94	0.96	0.98	1.00

*Hours*

Year	60	65	70	75	80	85	90	94
60	1.00							
65	0.78	1.00						
70	0.74	0.85	1.00					
75	0.64	0.74	0.78	1.00				
80	0.61	0.64	0.68	0.66	1.00			
85	0.58	0.59	0.61	0.63	0.57	1.00		
90	0.56	0.61	0.66	0.62	0.60	0.60	1.00	
94	0.52	0.62	0.66	0.63	0.61	0.59	0.80	1.00



**Table 3.2: Capital per Production Worker**  
Source: NBER Data- Weight Averages  
for 448 Manufacturing Sectors

	Avg. Log Capital	St. Dev. Log Cap.	% Prod. Worker
60	10.23	1.01	64.3%
65	10.35	0.98	64.4%
70	10.56	0.92	64.1%
75	10.78	0.85	64.9%
80	10.89	0.85	65.2%
85	11.08	0.85	61.3%
90	11.13	0.84	63.5%
93	11.17	0.85	62.2%

Our model links weekly hours and weekly wages to capital intensity. Table 3.2 reports the average and standard deviation of real log capital per production worker and the average of the percent of employees who are production workers for the 448 manufacturing sectors included in the sample. The capital intensity for each production worker is measured as total industry capital stock divided by the number of production workers.<sup>12</sup> The numbers in Table 3.2 indicate

that the average level of capital per production worker has been increasing steadily through the sample period while the standard error of the log has been decreasing. This growth in capital intensity may be due partly to errors in measurement. For example, it is possible that there has been a shift of capital from production to non-production workers and it is also possible that the depreciation rates do not adequately account for obsolescence in this period of supposed rapid technological advance.

### 3.4 Estimation of the Wage-Effort Offer Curve with 4-Digit data

To infer the wage-effort offer curve we estimate two separate regressions, one for weekly hours and one for weekly wages.

$$(3.1) \quad \log(\text{weekly hours})_i = \alpha_{i,t} + \beta_{1,i} \cdot \log\left(\frac{K}{PE}\right)_i + \beta_{2,i,t} \cdot \log\left(\frac{K}{PE}\right)_i^2 + \mu_i$$

$$(3.2) \quad \log(\text{weekly wages})_i = \alpha_i + \beta_{1,i} \cdot \log\left(\frac{K}{PE}\right)_i + \beta_{2,i,t} \cdot \log\left(\frac{K}{PE}\right)_i^2 + \beta_{2,i,t} \cdot \log\left(\frac{K}{PE}\right)_i^3 + \mu_i$$

We exclude the cubic of capital intensity from the hours equation because it is generally statistically insignificant. Data to estimate these equations are three-year averages centered on the years 1960, 65, 70, 75, 80, 85, 90 and 93. Observations are weighted by the number of production workers employed in the sector-year in order to prevent the small sectors from dragging the coefficients around.

<sup>12</sup> This seems to allocate all capital to production workers but a weaker assumption works. A formula for the total capital is  $K = k_n N + k_p P$  where  $N$  and  $P$  are non-production and production workers and  $k$  indicates the capital intensity of the job. From this equation we can solve for the capital intensity of the production job as  $(K/P) = k_n (N/P) + k_p$ . The weaker assumption is that the product of non-production capital intensity times non-production share of the workforce  $k_n (N/P)$  is adequately constant across sectors. In addition to this problem, no attempt is made to allow for differences in depreciation rates across sectors and real interest rates over time.

The results of these regressions are presented in table 3.3. The basic patterns of the results are as predicted and fairly constant over the sample period. Capital intensity explains close to 40% of the variation in weekly hours across sectors but somewhat more of the variation in weekly wages, 50% in 1960 and nearly 70% in the eighties. From the pair of estimated equations (3.1) and (3.2) we solve for the wage-effort offer curve by eliminating the capital intensity variable. Segments of these curves corresponding to observed capital intensities are plotted in Figures 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7. The capital intensity data has a large right tail so the capital range was determined as the minimum capital intensity observed in the data up to 2.5 standard deviations above the mean, roughly encompassing all but two outlying sectors of the sample, petroleum refining and blast furnaces. The lower left portions of the curves represent the wage-effort contracts in the relatively labor-intensive sectors, while the upper right portions represent the contracts in capital-intensive sectors. The eight regressions are divided into three sub-periods in which the shift of the curve takes a distinct form, 1960 to 1970, 1970 to 1980, and 1980 to 1993.

The wage-effort offer curves in Figure 3.6 for 1960 and 1965 show the distinct backward bending form of


**Table 3.3: Wage and Hour Regression Results**

Yr	Var	Hours Coef	se	Wages Coef	se		Hours Coef	se	Wages Coef	se
60	R <sup>2</sup>	0.369		0.5031		80	0.3835		0.6731	
	Int	2.1184	0.0783 *	8.3832	2.4432 *		2.1802	0.0994 *	15.2499	4.2042 *
	KL	0.2840	0.0156 *	-1.3892	0.7386 *		0.2406	0.0184 *	-3.5119	1.1691 *
	KL <sup>2</sup>	-0.0128	0.0008 *	0.1722	0.0737 *		-0.0096	0.0008 *	0.3770	0.1077 *
	KL <sup>3</sup>			-0.0061	0.0024 *				-0.0122	0.0033 *
65	R <sup>2</sup>	0.4466		0.5626		85	0.3884		0.6923	
	Int	2.0819	0.0760 *	12.6155	2.7216 *		1.9133	0.1163 *	9.7820	4.3422 *
	KL	0.2890	0.0150 *	-2.7023	0.8125 *		0.2821	0.0210 *	-2.0616	1.1779 *
	KL <sup>2</sup>	-0.0127	0.0007 *	0.3081	0.0801 *		-0.0111	0.0009 *	0.2481	0.1059 *
	KL <sup>3</sup>			-0.0107	0.0026 *				-0.0084	0.0032 *
70	R <sup>2</sup>	0.433		0.6083		90	0.3212		0.6751	
	Int	2.2968	0.0817 *	16.6675	3.1310 *		2.2617	0.1266 *	5.2251	4.4977
	KL	0.2337	0.0157 *	-3.8122	0.9069 *		0.2237	0.0227 *	-0.7699	1.2132
	KL <sup>2</sup>	-0.0097	0.0008 *	0.4073	0.0868 *		-0.0085	0.0010 *	0.1275	0.1085
	KL <sup>3</sup>			-0.0135	0.0028 *				-0.0047	0.0032
75	R <sup>2</sup>	0.3821		0.6422		93	0.2647		0.6534	
	Int	2.2975	0.1007 *	17.9309	4.0029 *		2.2208	0.1367 *	3.2645	4.3934
	KL	0.2213	0.0189 *	-4.2620	1.1285 *		0.2351	0.0244 *	-0.1503	1.1794
	KL <sup>2</sup>	-0.0088	0.0009 *	0.4512	0.1053 *		-0.0091	0.0011 *	0.0651	0.1050
	KL <sup>3</sup>			-0.0148	0.0033 *				-0.0027	0.0031

\*- Significant at the .05 level of significance

the wage-effort that was evident in the two-digit data in Figure 3.2. The lowest curve in Figure 3.5 is the wage-effort offer curve in 1960. Between 1960 and 1970 two changes appear to be happening. First the backward bending portion of the wage-effort curve has been diminishing, possibly due to the decline in the power that unions had which allowed them to negotiate favorable contracts in the early sixties. In addition, the entire curve has been shifting up and to the right.

**Figure 3.5: Derived Wage-Effort Offer Curves, 1960-1970**



The rightward shift is most evident in the labor-intensive sectors at the lower left portion of the curve. This appears to be due to a relative increase in capital intensity of these sectors. The average increase in capital

**Table 3.4: Changes in Capital Intensity 1960-1970, NBER Data**

Capital/Production Worker, 1960 - \$87	% Change 1960-70
\$0-\$9,999	56.8%
\$10,000-\$19,999	45.8%
\$20,000-\$29,999	32.5%
\$30,000-\$49,999	30.5%
\$50,000+	20.6%


**Table 3.5: Pattern of Capital Deepening from Levels Regressions**

Model	Int	Slope
K/L 70 on	Coef 1.705	0.867
K/L 60	se 0.165	0.016
K/L 80 on	Coef 0.718	0.964
K/L 70	se 0.160	0.015
K/L 90 on	Coef 0.560	0.976
K/L 80	se 0.187	0.017

intensity between 1960 and 1970 was 34% according to the Bartelsman data. Yet the largest increases occurred among the labor-intensive industries, as can be seen in table 3.4 which breaks capital growth down by capital intensity in 1960. The most capital-intensive industries increased their capital intensity on average only 20% compared to over 55% in labor-intensive industries. This pattern of change in capital intensities is exclusive to the sixties. Table 3.5 shows the results from three cross-sectional models regressing log capital intensity across industries on their values from the previous decade. The pattern of capital deepening can be seen in the slope coefficient. If the slope is less than one deepening is occurring primarily in the labor-

intensive sectors, greater than one implies deepening in the capital-intensive sectors. The slope is significantly below one in the sixties but very nearly one in the following two decades. These changes may be indicative of technological change. They may also be indicative of the movement of the most labor-intensive sub-sectors offshore.

Figure 3.6: Derived Wage-Effort Offer Curves, 1970-1980



The 1970s were very different from the 1960s. Figure 3.6 compares the wage-effort offer curves for 1970, 1975 and 1980. The backward bending portion of the wage-effort offer curve completely disappeared in the seventies. In addition, the offer curve twisted with the low-wage low-effort contracts experiencing a 15% reduction in wages and the high-wage high-effort contracts enjoying a 20% increase. The ratio of real hourly wages between the two end points of the curve increased from 2.3 in 1970 to over 3.3 in 1980 and peaked at 3.5 in 1985 before it stabilized at about 3.45. We are inclined to associate this twisting of the curve with the 1970's decline in the relative price of labor-intensive manufactures that is documented in Leamer(1997a).

This twisting of the curve of observed wage-effort offers is not compatible with a representative worker model with a stable utility function since the contracts in the capital-intensive sectors have unambiguously improved while those in the labor-intensive sectors have unambiguously deteriorated. This twisting of the curve could be an equilibrium if workers have heterogeneous preferences. Differences in adversity to effort may also explain a portion of the apparent rigidity of the labor market to changes in relative wages across sectors: despite the shift in the wage-effort offer curve, the distribution of production workers across sectors has remained fairly stable. This is illustrated in Table 3.6 which reports employment by quintile of capital intensity. The sectors with the lowest capital/labor ratios experienced an 8.5% reduction in employment between 1970 and 1980. The third

**Table 3.6: Changes in Employment of Production Workers by Quintiles of Capital Intensity: 1970-1980**

Capital Intensity	Employment 1970 ('000s)	Employment 1980 ('000s)	Change
1 <sup>st</sup> Quintile	2589.9	2379.4	-8.5%
2 <sup>nd</sup> Quintile	3172.6	3281.6	3.4%
3 <sup>rd</sup> Quintile	2619.2	2771.7	5.7%
4 <sup>th</sup> Quintile	2712.9	3050.4	11.7%
5 <sup>th</sup> Quintile	2545.1	2406.5	-5.6%

and fourth quintiles experienced the greatest gains while there was actually a decline in employment in the most capital-intensive sectors.


In the 1980s the wage-effort offer curve began to shift to the right, a movement that is depicted in Figure 3.7. In words, for the same wage levels, workers

were required to work more hours. The increase in weekly hours was between 2 and 3 hours during this 13-year period, more at the upper end of the wage-effort curve than at the lower end. One possible explanation for this shift is increasing real capital rental costs coming from the rise in the demand for capital induced by the economic liberalizations in Asian and Latin America. Another possible explanation is the introduction of new more expensive equipment (computers and robots) which shifts the curve as illustrated in the middle panel of Figure 2.5. A third possibility is the business cycle. There was a 4-point decline in unemployment after the peak during the recession in 1983. The strong correlation between employment and weekly hours was highlighted in Figure 3.2.

Yet there are a number of reasons to doubt the business cycle role in the sharp increase in weekly hours. One reason is the magnitude of the change. The larger change in unemployment between 1969 and 1983 (a reduction of 5.5 points) only lead to a 1.25 hour decrease in average weekly hours, much smaller than the 2 hour increase seen after 1983.


We think that a likely

**Figure 3.7: Derived Wage-Effort Offer Curves, 1980-1993**



cause for part of the shift in the wage-effort offer curve since 1980 was an increase in the quasi-fixed labor costs emphasized by Oi: training, payroll taxes and worker benefits. Whether it is capital or benefits, firms can save costs paid on a per-worker basis by getting more work out of each worker; thus more benefits for more hours. Figure 3.8 plots the ratio of a BLS employee benefits index relative to wages per worker in manufacturing in the 1980's. Between 1980 and 1996 this

**Figure 3.8: Benefit to Wage Costs in Manufacturing, 1989=100**  
 Source: BLS Labor Cost Indexes, Manufacturing



index increased about 25%. Note that the majority of this increase occurred *after* 1986. Unfortunately the data does not go back beyond 1979, so there is no way to compare this trend to earlier periods.

### 3.5 Controlling for Business Cycles

According to our estimates, the wage-effort offer curve has varied systematically over time, shifting up, then twisting and finally shifting right. The 1970 and 1980 dates at which we estimate the wage-effort offer curve were selected to conform with Leamer's(1997) claim that the 1970s were the Stolper-Samuelson decade in which there was a significant decline in the relative prices of labor-intensive tradables. But these years and the other five-year intervals at which we estimate the offer curve select different points in the business cycle, and some of the observed shifting may be due to the cycle not the fundamentals. In this section we show that in fact the timing is not essential. Comparisons, peak-to-peak and trough-to-trough, show the same shifting of the wage-effort offer curve.

We use the employment rate to define the cycle. As is evident in Figure 3.2, weekly hours leads the employment rate, a feature we attribute to a delay between an increase/reduction in product demand and the actual hiring/firing of workers. To capture the cycle in demand, we use the smoothed forward rate of employment as the indicator of the business cycle, and we compare peak to peak and trough to trough changes in the wage-effort offer

**Table 3.7: Wage and Hour Regressions at the Cyclical Peaks and Troughs**

Years	Trough					Peak					
	61,62	70,71	75,76	81,82	91,92	58,59	67,68	72,73	77,78	88,89	93,94
Hours Regs											
R <sup>2</sup>	.394	.445	.370	.332	.293	.359	.422	.450	.474	.365	.255
Int	2.038 *	2.284 *	2.356 *	2.427 *	2.299 *	2.257 *	2.193 *	2.092 *	2.096 *	2.061 *	2.190 *
k/l	.298 *	.235 *	.210 *	.196 *	.219 *	.259 *	.261 *	.264 *	.253 *	.258 *	.241 *
k/l <sup>2</sup>	-.0133 *	-.0097 *	-.0082 *	-.0077 *	-.0084 *	-.0117 *	-.0112 *	-.0108 *	-.0099 *	-.0100 *	-.0094 *
Wage Regs											
R <sup>2</sup>	.518	.626	.649	.692	.674	.484	.540	.635	.661	.668	.646
Int	9.031 *	17.448 *	17.406 *	12.350 *	4.197	7.263 *	11.239 *	21.654 *	18.875 *	7.299	2.975
k/l	-1.599 *	-4.045 *	-4.117 *	-2.667 *	-4.48	-1.032	-2.243 *	-5.296 *	-4.565 *	-1.353	-0.56
k/l <sup>2</sup>	.195 *	.430 *	.437 *	.295 *	.095	.135	.260 *	.550 *	.480 *	.182	.056
k/l <sup>3</sup>	-.0069 *	-.0142 *	-.0143 *	-.0096 *	-.0036	-.0049 *	-.0090 *	-.0180 *	-.0156 *	-.0064	-.0024

curve. Using smoother year-ahead rate of employment again as our guide we set our trough years as 61-62, 70-71, 75-76, 81-82, and 91-92. The peak years were set at 58-59, 67-68, 72-73, 77-78, 88-89 and 93-94. The results of these peak and trough regressions are displayed in Table 3.7.

These regressions can be used to solve for the wage-effort offer curves like those displayed in Figures 3.5 through 3.7. When we do so the peak-to-peak and the trough-to-trough comparisons are completely in line with our first results that ignored the business cycle. In the 1960s the wage-effort offer curve moved up and to the right, in the 1970s it twisted, and in the 1980s it shifted sharply to the right. Additionally when we put consecutive peak and trough years next to each other such as 70,71-72,73 and 77,78-81,82 we find very little difference between the shapes of these curves. The trends we see in the wage-effort curves tend to be long term and appear to occur exogenous to cyclical effects.

### 3.6 Evaluation of Alternative Explanations of the Wage-Effort curve

We are excited by how well these results conform with the theory, but we need to be alert to the possibility that these findings are driven by some third factor that has nothing to do with effort. Our number one concern is that human capital is correlated with physical capital and with hours, and that what we are observing is not compensation for effort but compensation for skill and skilled workers choosing longer hours. Unionization is also a concern. Unions might be able to bargain for a wage-effort contract above the competitive market curve. A strong union effect might account for the outlying sectors observed in the 2-digit level data. Even without unions, profit sharing may help to explain the pattern of wages. The realized returns to capital vary widely across sectors

and also across time. Firms in the less competitive sectors may collect positive rents and may share those rents with workers.

The Bartelsman data set does not include information on unionization or education. We have formed industry estimates of production worker education from the Current Population Surveys. To do this we had to match the 71 3-digit CPS manufacturing industries with the 448 industries in the NBER productivity database.<sup>13</sup> Data from Kokkelenberg and Sockell(1985) on union status was used for the 1973 to 1981 period while data from Hirsch and Macpherson(1993) were used for the later years. These measures are also created from the CPS data, so they match with the NBER data in the same way that the education measures do.

Industry rents are particularly difficult to measure. The NBER data provides a measure of value added. Theoretically this variable represents employee wages, other employee benefits such as social security which are not directly included in the wage bill<sup>14</sup>, ex-ante capital rental costs, industry rents if any, and finally firm-specific rents which accrue to the owners of the capital,

$$(3.3) \quad VA_i = w \cdot Emp_i + w_B \cdot Emp_i + r \cdot Capital_i + rent_i + \mu_{it}.$$

With the admittedly suspicious assumption that capital rental rates and worker benefit rates are constant across industries, we can extract from value added that which is due to capital intensity and treat the residual as rent,

$$(3.4) \quad \frac{VA_i - w \cdot Emp_i}{emp_i} = \alpha + \beta \cdot \frac{Capital}{Emp} + \varepsilon_i.$$

The coefficient  $\alpha$  represents the per worker cost of non-wage benefits plus average rents,  $\beta$  represents the capital rental costs, and  $\varepsilon$  is the rent residual. Since it is impossible to separate from the constant that part which represents average rents, we use only the estimated rent residuals smoothed over seven periods to form estimates of sectoral long run rents.<sup>15</sup>

Table 3.8 reports a number of basic statistics for the additional data. The average education level for production workers was slightly less than 12 years in 1993, up from only 10 years in 1960. There are distinct differences in the educational attainment of workers across sectors. In 1990 the average years of schooling varied

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<sup>13</sup> CPS industry data at the three-digit level is available between 1971 and 1994, so the 1971 data was matched with the earlier NBER data for the regressions.

<sup>14</sup> The wage data in the NBER data does not include some worker benefits.



**Table 3.8: Supplemental Statistics**

Additional explanatory variables for wage and hour regressions computed per production worker.

		1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1993
Education	Mean	10.2	10.2	10.2	10.6	11.0	11.3	11.5	11.6
	St Dev	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.7
	Min	7.5	7.5	7.5	8.7	8.3	9.4	8.9	9.5
	Max	11.8	11.8	11.8	12.4	12.6	13.0	13.5	13.7
Union Status	Mean	42.0%	42.5%	41.9%	39.7%	36.8%	27.5%	22.6%	20.4%
	Min	12.3%	12.3%	12.3%	5.6%	4.1%	4.5%	2.4%	2.1%
	Max	81.8%	81.8%	81.8%	76.6%	75.4%	62.5%	58.6%	59.4%
Rents	Mean	-0.3	-0.3	-0.4	-0.5	-0.8	-0.9	-1.0	-1.0
	St Dev	4.6	5.6	6.6	7.3	8.7	11.9	16.7	18.0
	Min	-9.4	-13.7	-22.8	-27.6	-37.3	-44.2	-39.0	-53.8
	Max	37.4	58.8	73.0	74.5	87.1	139.5	256.7	286.1

across sectors from 9 years to 13.5 years. Around 20% of production workers were actively enrolled in unions or covered by a union contract in 1993, a significant decrease from the 42% enrollment in 1960. Again there appears to be a fairly large variation in union participation across sectors, with a maximum of 60% to a minimum of 2% in 1993. In 1960 this range stretched between 12% and 82%. The bottom of table 3.8 provides basic statistics on the computed industry rents. Note that these data have been converted to real values by dividing by the PPI deflator. The average rent is close to zero in each period, a function of the regression technique employed to construct this measure. Interestingly there has been a sharp increase in the variance of rents since 1980.

Except for the percentages, unionization rate and female rate, all these variables will be entered into our equation in logarithmic form. Table 3.9 reports the correlations between different variables within a data set and also between the same variables from the CPS data and the NBER data. The correlation between average weekly hours and average weekly wages across the two data sets are respectively 0.55 and 0.75 implying that the patterns seen in the NBER data are in part replicated in the CPS data despite the large differences in the collection techniques employed by the two sources.

Of the other variables, education appears to be significantly correlated with both wages and hours. Not surprisingly educated workers are also over-represented in capital-intensive sectors. Unionization is highly correlated with wages and positively correlated, albeit weakly, with weekly hours. This surprising result may be linked to the high positive correlation between union activity and the capital intensity of the industry. Rents are also positively correlated with capital intensity. These correlations make it possible that what we are seeing in the

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<sup>15</sup> For the purpose of the regression analysis rents were also put into log form by taking the log of the 100 \* the

initial set of wage and hour regressions is only omitted variable bias not a wage-effort offer curve. These new variables will now be included in another set of regressions.

Although the female percentage is reported in Table 3.9,

we exclude it from our equations because we think it represents at least partly the supply side. Proper econometric estimation of the joint (supply and demand) determination of the wage-effort offer curve with heterogeneous workers is beyond the scope of this paper. The data do indicate that females tend to be employed in labor-intensive (i.e. low wage-low hours) sectors.

Proper treatment of the human capital variable is another delicate task, which has been discussed more fully in Leamer(1996). Here we note that the model depicted in Figure 2.1 is based on the assumptions that workers are fully charged for the capital they use and that the wage we observe is total earnings net of all capital charges. To put it another way, we assume that workers do not bring their own tools to the workplace, and we assume also that workers have no other sources of wealth that can be used to finance consumption. Both of these assumptions are violated by human capital, first because the wage that we observe is not net of the implicit human capital rental costs<sup>16</sup> and second because human capital acquired in formal education is partly financed by the government and by the worker's parents. Absent these two problems, we could simply combine human and physical capital into a single capital aggregate.

This is illustrated in Figure 3.9 which depicts three different jobs with differing fixed levels of human capital inputs and the same fixed level of physical capital inputs. One job uses physical capital only, the second job uses the same physical capital but also self-financed human capital, and the third job is the same as the second except that the human capital is provided without cost to the worker. The envelope of preferred contracts absent

**Table 3.9: CPS and NBER Data Correlation Statistics- 1990 data**  
Correlations computed with all variables in log form.


<u>NBER Data</u>		<i>Hhr</i>	<i>WW</i>	<i>KE</i>	<i>Chrs</i>	<i>CWW</i>	<i>Edu</i>	<i>Uni</i>	<i>Rent</i>
Hours / Week	<i>Hrs</i>	1							
Wage / Week	<i>WW</i>	.57	1						
Capital	<i>KE</i>	.54	.81	1					
<u>CPS Data</u>									
Hours / Week	<i>Chrs</i>	.55	.55	.38	1				
Wage / Week	<i>CWW</i>	.45	.75	.55	.66	1			
Education	<i>Euy</i>	.35	.67	.49	.62	.83	1		
Union	<i>Uni</i>	.23	.51	.33	.40	.67	.19	1	
Rents	<i>Rent</i>	-.01	.26	.34	-.05	.19	.22	-.02	1
Female	<i>Fem</i>	-.39	-.47	-.38	-.80	-.75	-.40	-.39	.07

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absolute value and multiplying by the sign of the initial value. Values between .01 and -.01 were set to 0.

<sup>16</sup> An exception is firm-specific training, financed by the firm. The education variable we use merely counts the years of formal schooling, those which create human capital owned by the worker, not the firm.

Figure 3.9: Wage Effort Offer Curves by Level of Education



free education is the heavy wage-effort offer curve in Figure 3.9 which has the same character as the wage-effort offer curves that we have been discussing. Namely, the high-effort high (net) wage contracts are intensive in human capital. If the human capital is provided free of charge, then the offer line facing the educated worker has the slope of the original educated worker line but the intercept of the no-education line. This line of contracts with free-education completely dominates the contracts if education is charged to the workers.<sup>17</sup>

Empirically, there are a number of directions that this discussion of education could lead. One is nowhere. If education is free and everyone has the same ability, then the regressions of wages and hours on capital-intensity define the wage-effort offer curve. It may be that the educational requirements vary along the curve, but that is entirely immaterial because workers do not incur a cost for the education. If education is free, but ability is heterogeneous (and unobservable) and interacts with education, then we are in a lot of trouble and don't

<sup>17</sup> On a side note this resulting equilibrium suffers from two kinds of inefficiencies: too much education and too little effort. It is efficient to have some workers operating without human capital investments, but once it is free, everyone opts for the education. It is efficient to have educated workers supplying a high level of effort but the wealth transfer to them in the form of free human capital affords them the opportunity to “take it easy” but still earn high wages. The economic inefficiency here is not caused simply by some workers opting to take-it-easy. The inefficiency is caused by workers taking-it-easy while they use expensive capital. This inefficiency would not occur if human capital were transferable among workers. For example, if the wealth transfer to workers were financial or physical capital, then these wealthy workers could efficiently opt to supply low levels of effort but they would then take jobs that didn't require much capital.

want to talk about it. If human capital is self-financed, then ideally we would amend equation (3.1) and (3.2) by aggregating human with physical capital, and by subtracting from weekly wages a term that is proportional to human capital and that represents the human capital rental charges. We don't know how to aggregate years of education with dollars of physical capital and we don't know what is the implicit rental rate of human capital to net from wages. What we do is add the human capital variable to our equations, and hope for the best, recognizing that our wage equation is gross of human capital rental charges but net of physical capital rent.. We plan on revisiting the issues of educational financing and heterogeneity in ability in subsequent work.

Keeping all these concerns in mind, the wage and hour regressions are re-estimated using the same functional forms as before but with three new variables; the percentage of employees with union status, the log of average education, and the measure of industry rents. The variable for percent female was not included in these regressions, as we believe that this is a supply side rather than a demand side variable. Also included were two interactive variables, between union status and capital intensity and between industry rents and capital intensity. These interaction terms allow for the greater market power that employees may have in capital-intensive industries. The inclusion of the interactive term between education and capital made the results highly unstable and increased the standard errors significantly, thus was dropped from the regressions.

We draw your attention to the set of supplemental regressions presented in Table 3.10. The adjusted  $R^2$  for each of the regressions has increased, although more so for the wage regressions than the hours regressions. The signs on the additional variables in the wage regression are mostly as would be expected, and mostly significant. The capital intensity variable has retained a significant positive impact on both hours and wages despite the inclusion of the other variables including education. When we include the respective interactive coefficients the magnitudes are quite similar to those of the initial regressions, although additional formal analysis will be performed to verify this.

The average education of production workers has a significant effect on average weekly wages that increases over time. There was a particularly sharp rise between 1980 and 1985, a result which conforms with the literature on changes in the returns to education over this period. Holding all else equal the average relative wage difference between a worker with two years of college and a high school dropout with 10 years of education increased from 31% in 1970 to 39% in 1980 to 55% in 1985 then dropping back slightly to 48% in 1993.

**Table 3.10 Supplementary Log Wage and Log Hour Regressions**

All variables in log form except union status.

Year	60	65	70	75	80	85	90	93
<b>Hours</b>								
R <sup>2</sup>	.401	.467	.463	.392	.390	.429	.368	.327
Int	1.774 *	1.890 *	2.263 *	2.186 *	1.994 *	1.493 *	2.014 *	1.963 *
KL	.323 *	.342 *	.280 *	.263 *	.268 *	.327 *	.266 *	.238 *
KL <sup>2</sup>	-.0142 *	-.0151 *	-.0115 *	-.0106 *	-.0103 *	-.0132 *	-.0105 *	-.0091 *
Edu	.0369 *	-.0486 *	-.1097 *	-.0573 *	-.0106	.0659 *	.0055	.0837 *
Union	.1895 *	-.0199	.0483	.0079	.2364 *	-.0329	-.3577 *	.0766
Union*KL	-.0169 *	.0039	-.0037	.0010	-.0217 *	.0080	.0328 *	-.0021
Rent	-.0194 *	-.0192 *	-.0104 *	-.0092 *	-.0095 *	-.0126 *	-.0071 *	-.0091 *
Rent*KL	.0019 *	.0018 *	.0009 *	.0009 *	.0008 *	.0010 *	.0004	.0006
<b>Wages</b>								
R <sup>2</sup>	.655	.667	.690	.748	.768	.803	.787	.783
Int	-.235	-.387	.257	-.785	-.385	-4.237 *	-3.324 *	-1.843 *
KL	.439 *	.594 *	.552 *	.641 *	.546 *	.909 *	.810 *	.542 *
KL <sup>2</sup>	-.0186 *	-.0245 *	-.0218 *	-.0261 *	-.0220 *	-.0330 *	-.0275 *	-.0149 *
Edu	1.417 *	1.111 *	.932 *	1.138 *	1.176 *	1.655 *	1.440 *	1.416 *
Union	-2.300 *	-1.827 *	-2.225 *	-3.151 *	-4.161 *	-1.310 *	-.925	.493
Union*KL	.2331 *	.1945 *	.2256 *	.3218 *	.4135 *	.1724 *	.1464 *	.0277
Rent	-.0220 *	-.0217	-.0175	.0036	.0421 *	-.0306 *	-.0549 *	-.0339 *
Rent*KL	.0020 *	.0021 *	.0018	.0000	-.0034 *	.0029 *	.0049 *	.0031 *

Interestingly at the same time there was also a substantial change in the impact of education on effort. In 1970 the worker with 14 years of education worked on average 1.5 hours less than the high school dropout. By 1993 this had reversed such that the college educated worked 1 hour more per week on average than the high school dropout. This empirical fact sets us to thinking about possible explanations. One explanation we like is that new very-productive jobs emerged in the 1980s that required both high amounts of human capital and high inputs of physical capital (computers). But maybe it is the decline in the marginal tax rates, or the increasing cost of higher education, or something else entirely. Work is under way to answer this important question; why are the educated working so much harder today than they did 30 years ago?

The interactive terms make it difficult to clearly see the impact of rents and union status on wages and hours. To facilitate the discussion of these interaction terms, Table 3.11 displays the estimated impact of a one-percent increase in union participation and in industry rents separately for a labor-intensive industry and a capital-intensive industry.<sup>18</sup> The impact of union status on weekly hours is very small in magnitude but on wages is significant. Not surprisingly, the presence of unions tends to raise wages in the capital-intensive sectors more than

<sup>18</sup> These industries are defined at the minimum and maximum levels of capital intensity for each time period respectively.

**Table 3.11: Variation in Union and Rents Effects**  
Impact of a 1% increase in rents and union status on weekly hours and wages by capital intensity

Capital	Hours			Wages			Variable Average
	Low KL	Avg KL	High KL	Low KL	Avg KL	High KL	
Unions							Union
60	.07%	.02%	-.02%	-.72%	.09%	.65%	42.0%
65	.01%	.02%	.03%	-.36%	.19%	.65%	42.5%
70	.02%	.01%	.00%	-.39%	.16%	.66%	41.9%
75	.02%	.02%	.02%	-.43%	.32%	.98%	39.7%
80	.05%	.00%	-.04%	-.59%	.34%	1.19%	36.8%
85	.04%	.06%	.07%	.22%	.60%	.95%	27.5%
90	-.07%	.01%	.07%	.37%	.71%	1.00%	22.6%
93	.06%	.05%	.05%	.74%	.80%	.86%	20.4%
Rents							Rents
60	-.63%	.03%	.50%	-.87%	-.20%	.27%	-1.82
65	-.56%	-.05%	.37%	-.60%	-.02%	.47%	-1.72
70	-.28%	-.06%	.15%	-.30%	.14%	.53%	-1.81
75	-.19%	.02%	.20%	.36%	.37%	.37%	-1.94
80	-.23%	-.04%	.13%	1.32%	.56%	-.13%	-1.94
85	-.39%	-.18%	.02%	-.50%	.14%	.73%	-2.48
90	-.32%	-.22%	-.13%	-1.17%	-.05%	.94%	-3.11
93	-.39%	-.26%	-.14%	-.67%	.02%	.64%	-3.23

in the labor-intensive sectors. But up until 1985 unions seemed to have a *negative* effect on wages in labor-intensive industries. This result is possibly caused by another potential endogeneity problem, this time between capital-intensity and unions. When unions successfully raise wages firms naturally become more capital-intensive. The overall decline of union presence from 39% in 1975 to 20% in 1993 may explain why this odd result has dissipated. Another

interpretation is that unions seek preferred contracts in terms of both wages and effort level. In the capital-intensive sectors, where the cost of cutting effort is very high, unions opt for higher wages and perhaps not much change in effort. In the labor-intensive sectors, unions pursue the effort dimension of the contract more aggressively and end up opting for a contract which has greatly reduced effort and also somewhat reduced wages. (Here we are speaking about effort in the form of pace rather than in the total number of hours.)

We are uncomfortable with both the theory of rent-sharing and also our measurement of rents, and we consequently do not place a great deal of faith in the rent results in Table 3.11. According to these estimates, industry rents seem to reduce hours in labor-intensive sectors but raise hours in capital intensive sectors. Rents have a mixed effect over time on wages in the labor-intensive sectors but consistently raise wages in the capital-intensive sector. reflect the potential for profit sharing within an industry which is not fully competitive.

The point of this lengthy discussion of additional variables is primarily to determine if our initial estimate of the wage-effort offer curve is substantially contaminated by the omission of all these effects. Since we are now treating human capital as self-financed, in principle we want to trace out the wage-effort offer curve after aggregating human and physical capital and after removing from wages the implicit rental cost of human capital.

This is not easily done, and what we do instead is to trace out the curve in the same way as before, using the new coefficients on the capital-intensity variables and holding fixed all the other variables at their sample averages. The results are display in Figure 3.10. Although the shape of the wage-effort offer curves is altered slightly, the same basic patterns of change can be seen in the three periods.


#### 4.0 Conclusions

We have provided in this paper substantial evidence that the US labor market offers a set of wage-effort contracts, with effort measured by annual hours. This curve is uncovered by estimating two equations using industry level data. One equation explains wages as a function of capital intensity and the other equation explains hours also as a function of capital intensity. By solving out the capital intensity from these two equations we form a wage-hour offer curve.

We have found that this offer curve shifts in three distinctly different ways. Between 1960 and 1970 the wage-effort offer curve shifted “up” with higher wages offered at every level of effort. Between 1970 and 1980. the wage-effort offer curve “twisted”; with the best contracts getting better and the worst contracts getting worse. Since the 1980s the wage-effort offer

curve has shifted to the right, requiring more effort for the same wage level. The upward shift in the 1960s is consistent with capital deepening, the twisting in the 1970s with price declines of labor-intensive tradables, and the

**Figure 3.10: Derived Wage-Effort Offer Curve, 60-93**  
Controlling for Education, Unions, and Industry Rents



rightward shift after 1980 either with the introduction of new equipment or with increases in government mandated benefits.

The weakest link in our empirical analysis is probably the use of hours as a measure of effort. Despite problems with hours as a measure of effort, we find a consistent and significant relationship between wages, effort as measured by hours and capital intensity. This relationship stands up even when we control for the business cycle, education, unionization and estimated industry rents.

This is, of course, not the end of the story by any means. We should be studying tasks, not industries. We should be looking at individual data and data outside of manufacturing. We should be allowing more completely for heterogeneity in ability and tastes. We should have a better measure of unionization. We should explicitly link changes in the wage-effort offer curve to the fundamental drivers such as globalization, technical change and worker benefits. Most of all, we need a better measure of effort.

Though this is not the end of the story, it is a very good beginning.



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